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that prior to the filing of the case two pol-
icy decisions must be made by the les-
bian mother. The first decision is 
whether or not anyone should be told of 
the mother's lesbianism. On the one 
hand, custody determinations are never 
final, and if someone later finds that the 
mother is a lesbian, it would be relatively 
easy to establish a material change in cir-
cumstance justifying the revocation of 
the mother's custody. On the other 
hand, a mother who is straight" has a 
much better chance of being awarded 
custody of her children than a lesbian 
mother. Thus the choice must be made 
between' having an easy custody fight 
and risking a later challenge on the basis 
of a discovery of lesbianism, and reveal-
ing the facts at the beginning and facing a 
much tougher case. 
The second big decision is whether or 
not the client should mention a lover. It is 
quite clear that a judge is more likely to 
award custody to a lesbian mother 
where she is not practicing lesbianism; 
however, one must consider that a heal-
thy, well-adjusted mother will be best for 
her children, and part of being healthy 
and well-adjusted is having an outlet for 
sexual and emotional fulfillment. 
As a practical matter, the key to win-
ning a lesbian mother custody fight is to 
keep the case out of court. This is espe-
cially important when one realizes the 
very broad discretion which a trial judge 
has in determining the issue of custody; 
the standard which is used in determin-
ing the issue is simply the best interests of 
the child, however measured by the 
court, and a custody determination will 
not be overturned on appeal save for 
grave abuse. 
There are several tactical maneuvers 
which should be used in attempting to 
keep the fight out of court. The primary 
method for accomplishing this goal is to 
settle. Before attempting a settlement 
however, the motives of the challenging 
party, usually the father, should be 
evaluated. Once these motives have 
been determined, it will be easier to offer 
a compromise which will satisfy them 
and give the mother custody. For exam-
ple, where the father's actions are 
motivated by pecuniary conSiderations, 
a lesbian mother may be faced with a 
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deal such as limiting or eliminating child 
support in exchange for the father's 
promise not to challenge her custody. 
Each lesbian mother will have a different 
compromise level, but before rejecting 
what seems to be an extremely predjudi-
cial offer, the dangers of a judicial deter-
mination of custody should be stressed. 
If the challenging party refuses to set-
tle, the panelists advocate a course of ac-
tion which they termed' 'fighting fire with 
fire." This consists of collecting all ofthe 
dirt one can find on the challenging 
party, to be used as evidence at trial in 
determining the best interests of the 
child. Of course one should make clear 
to the other side that such dirt is available 
and perhaps then some eqUitable set-
tlement may be arranged. 
If no settlement is possible and the 
case comes to trial, the primary thing to 
remember is that a custody case is won 
or lost at the trial level. As stated before 
the only ground for reversal of a custody 
determination on appeal is grave abuse 
of discretion by the trial judge. Such 
abuse is unlikely to be found in most cus-
tody determinations, but especially un-
likely in cases involving a lesbian 
mother. 
At trial, the attorney for the lesbian 
mother should not allow the judge to 
focus on the mother's sexual prefer-
ences. It should be argued that no evi-
dence of lesbianism should be admitted 
unless it can be shown by the opposition 
that there is a nexus between the 
mother's sexual conduct and an adverse 
effect on the well being of the children. 
Unless such a connection can be shown, 
evidence of lesbianism is irrelevant to the 
issue of the best interests of the children. 
If it is decided that evidence of les-
bianism will be admissible the panelists 
stressed that the mother's attorney 
should be the first to make it an issue. 
This tactic is considered preferable to al-
lowing the opposition to bring it up be-
cause it avoids embarrassing questions 
which the judge or opposing counsel 
may pose to the mother. In bringing up 
the issue of lesbianism, the speakers 
suggested that an expert psychiatric wit-
ness should be produced. The witness 
should have preViously interviewed the 
mother and children and should be pre-
pared to testify as to the relationships be-
tween them. He should be prepared to 
testify as to the causes of lesbianism, the 
similarities between lesbian mothers and 
"straight" mothers, and as to specific in-
formation about the particular family 
unit and its acceptance of the situation. 
Both speakers acknowledged the dif-
ficulties involved in this type of custody 
litigation. Both admitted that in many 
cases a child may be stigmatized by a 
mother's open display of homosexual-
ity. In spite of these difficulties, the 
panelists thought that in many cases the 
children's interests will best be served by 
allowing them to remain with their 
mother. In such cases there is an over-
whelming need for competent attorneys 
who are willing and able to give the same 
quality of representation to a lesbian 







by Byron L. Warnken 
The Supreme Court, in an 8-0 deci-
sion in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 
Tax Comm'r. 96 S.Ct. 535 (1976) (Mr. 
Justice White, concurring in the judg-
ment), held that a nondiscriminatory ad 
valorem property tax levied against a 
wholesale inventory of imported tires 
was not an "impost" or "duty" on im-
ports, as prohibited by the "import-
export" clause, art. I, § 10, cl. 2 of the 
constitution. In the process, the Court 
overruled Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 29 (1871), which one hundred 
years earlier had held that such a"tax was 
constitutionally forbidden until such time 
as the imports became incorporated into 
the general mass of property within the 
state. 
Michelin Tire Corp. (petitioner) im-
ported tires and tubes, for which it was 
assessed an ad valorem property tax on 
its wholesale inventory, allegedly still in 
the original package. In an action for de-
claratory and injunctive relief brought in 
state court against the county tax com-
missioner, Michelin was successful in its 
contention that the "import-export" 
clause prohibited such taxation. The 
Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed in 
part and reversed in part, holding that, 
while the tubes in corrugated shipping 
cartons were free from ad valorem taxa-
tion, the tires had been sorted, comming-
led with other tires, and arranged for 
sale. without addressing the issue of 
whether these tires had lost their import 
status, the Supreme Court affirmed. In 
overruling Low v. Austin, the Court held 
that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax 
against imported tires is not within the 
constitutional prohibition against laying 
duties on imports. 
Chris Michael 
About one-fourth of the tires and 
tubes in question were manufactured in 
Nova Scotia and imported in tractor 
trailers packed and sealed in Nova 
Scotia. The other three-fourths were 
packed and sealed in France or Nova 
Scotia, from which they were imported 
in sea vans (tractor-hauled trailers from 
which the wheels are removed during 
sea shipment). Without being packaged 
or bundled, the tires were packed in bulk 
in the trailers and vans. Upon arrival at 
the wholesale distribution point, the tires 
were sorted and stacked by size and 
style, ready for sale and shipment to re-
tailers. 
Both Georgia courts found the tax 
constitutionally infirm by relying on Low 
v. Austin, a decision based upon the 
Court's interpretation of the landmark 
case of Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 
Wheat.) 419 (1827). In Brown, Chief 
Justice Marshall stated that " ... while [the 
thing imported remains] the property of 
the importer, in his warehouse, in the 
original form or package in which it was 
imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a 
duty on imports to escape the prohibi-
tion in the constitution." Id. at 442. Mr. 
Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court 
in Michelin, stated: 
"Our independent study per-
suades us that a nondiscriminatory 
ad valorem tax is not the type of 
state exaction which the Framers of 
the Constitution or the Court in 
Brown had in mind as being an im-
post or duty and that Low v. Aus-
tin's reliance upon the Brown dic-
tum to reach the contrary conclu-
sion was misplaced." 96 S. Ct. at 
539. 
The Court reasoned that the framers 
of the Constitution committed exclusive 
power to the federal government to lay 
imposts and duties on imports because 
(1), the government should speak with 
one voice when regulating commercial 
relations with foreign governments, (2), 
the federal government should be the 
recipient of revenue from imports, and 
(3), harmony among the states could be 
better maintained if the advantage of 
seaboard states to collect import taxes 
was neutralized. The Court found that 
none of the ills for which the "import-
export" clause was designed to remedy 
were promoted by a nondiscriminatory 
ad valorem property tax imposed upon 
imported goods no longer in transit. 
Such right of taxation does not give sea-
board states an advantage over interior 
states, nor does it affect the federal gov-
ernment's exclusive rights as regulator of 
foreign commerce and recipient of re-
venue thereform. 
Distinguishing the tax at issue from the 
prohibited "imposts" and "duties," the 
Court succinctly explained not only why 
such a tax was not unconstitutional, but 
why it was a rational and equitable tax-
ing device. 
"Unlike imports and duties, which 
are essentially taxes on the com-
mercial privilege of bringing goods 
into a country, such property taxes 
are taxes by which a State appor-
tions the cost of such services as 
police and fire protection among 
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the beneficiaries according to their 
respective wealth; there is no rea-
son why an importer should not 
bear his share of these costs along 
with his competitors handling only 
domestic goods. The Import-
Export Clause clearly prohibits state 
taxation based on the foreign origin 
of the imported goods, but it can 
not be read to accord imported 
goods preferential treatment that 
permits escape from uniform taxes 
imposed without regard to foreign 
origin for services which the State 
supplies." Id. at 541. 
The court readily admitted that such a 
tax is likely to increase the cost of the 
goods at the consumer level. However, it 
suggested that this is no different from 
resultant increased cost of similarly taxed 
domestic goods. In essence, the cost of 
police and fire protection, as well as 
other services provided by the state, are 
passed on to the ultimate consumer in 
the same manner as transportation 
costs, insurance costs, etc. 
Concluding its discussion of the effect 
of nondiscriminatory ad valorem taxa-
tion, in light of the framers' intent regard-
ing imports, the Court noted that 
" ... since prohibition of nondis-
criminatory ad valorem property 
taxation would not further the ob-
jectives of the Import-Export 
Clause, only the clearest constitu-
tional mandate should lead us to 
condemn such taxation. The ter-
minology employed in the 
clause - Imposts or Duties - is 
sufficiently ambiguous that we de-
cline to presume it was intended to 
embrace taxation that does not 
create the evils the clause was speci-
fically intended to eliminate." Id. at 
544. 
The Michelin Court prefaced its over-
uling of Low v. Austin with an examina-
tion of Brown and an understanding of 
how Low v. Austin misapplied it. In 
Brown, the Court adopted the "original 
package" doctrine as the test for deter-
mining when goods are imports constitu-
tionally protected from "imposts" and 
"duties. " 
" ... [W]hen the importer has so 
acted upon the thing imported, that 
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it has become incorporated and 
mixed up with the mass of property 
in the country, it has, perhaps, lost 
its distinctive character as an im-
port, and has become subject to the 
taxing power of the State; but while 
remaining the property of the im-
porter, in his warehouse, in the orig-
inal form or package in which it was 
imported, a tax upon it is too plainly 
a duty on imports to escape the 
prohibition in the Constitution." 25 
U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 441-42. 
In declaring unconstitutional a state 
law requiring importers and their 
wholesalers to obtain a $50 license as a 
prerequisite to doing bUSiness, the Court 
in Brown declared that: 
" ... the tax intercepts the import, as 
an import, on its way to become in-
corporated with the general mass of 
property, and denies it the privilege 
of becoming so incorporated until it 
shall have contributed to the re-
venue of the State." Id. at 443 
(Emphasis added). 
Low v. Austin expanded the "original 
package" doctrine of Brown to prohibit 
any imposition, such as a nondis-
criminatory ad valorem property tax, as 
long as the goods still met the doctrine's 
definition of an import. 
The Low v. Austin Court failed to 
heed the Brown warning that 
" ... the boundary between the 
power of the States to tax persons 
and property within their jurisdic-
tions and the limitations on the 
power of the State to impose im-
posts or duties with respect to 'im-
ports' was a subtle and difficult line 
which must be drawn as the cases 
arise." E96 S.Ct. at 547. 
Despite the Court's noting that it 
" ... might be premature to state any rule 
as being universal in its application ... " 
Id., Low v. Austin did just that, prohibit-
ing any imposition upon goods still in 
their original package. 
The Court in Low v. Austin also mis-
sed the language of the License Cases, 
46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), which di-
rectly answered the issue of Low v. Au-
stin, as well as Michelin. 
Undoubtedly a State may im-
pose a tax upon its citizens in prop-
ortion to the amount they are re-
spectively worth; and the importing 
merchant is liable to this assessment 
like any other citizen, and is charge-
able according to the amount of his 
property, whether it consists of 
money engaged in trade, or of im-
ported goods which he proposes to 
sell, or any other property of which 
he is the owner. But a tax of this 
description stands upon a very 
different footing from a tax on the 
thing imported, while it remains a 
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part of foreign commerce, and is 
not introduced into the general 
mass of property in the State. 46 
U.S. (5 How.) at 576. 
Although it can be argued that the 
Court in Michelin did nothing more than 
follow an 1847 precedent, the signifi-
cance is in its overruling of Low v. Au-
stin, an action which is demonstrative of 
the modern trend requiring commerce 
to "pay its own way." of., Colonial 
Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 
(1975). Since all taxes place some bur-
den upon commerce, the courts are be-
ginning to look less to the burden and 
more to the benefits that inure as a result 
of the tax, such as fire protection, police 
protection, etc. It appears that the tax will 
be upheld as long as it is not discrimina-
tory and provided that the benefits re-
ceived as a result of the tax outweigh the 
burdens it places upon commerce. 
When commerce pays its own way 
through nondiscriminatory taxation, 
commerce, although theoretically bur-
dened, is actually promoted, as a result 
of the benefits that tax dollars provide. 
The Michelin Court addressed the 
issue of whether a nondiscriminatory ad 
valorem property tax was an "impost" 
pr' 'duty," yet failed to take advantage of 
the opportunity to refine the "original 
package" doctrine. In devising the doc-
trine, the Court in Brown realized that 
the line between import and non-import 
status may indeed be a fine one and re-
commended that the line be drawn as 
each demands. This was appropriate, 
since an 1827 court could not possibly 
have foreseen the complexities of defin-
ing that line in a world of commerce 
where tires have no package other than 
the huge container in which they are 
shipped, and that the container adds and 
deletes wheels and tractor cabs as neces-
sary to enable it, without a transfer of 
goods, to surround the goods, perhaps 
as their' 'original package," almost from 
the point of manufacture to the point of 
sale. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Jus-
tice White, without explaining his rea-
sons, did find that the goods in this case 
had lost their import status, subjecting 
them to ad valorem taxation. Thus he 
found the same result without the need 
to overrule Low v. Austin. 
The practical effect of this case may 
well be that as long as the state imposes 
the now approved nondiscriminatory 
tax, without regard to import or non-
import status, against goods no longer in 
transit, a determination of the exact 
moment when the goods lose their im-
port status is of little importance, since 
the tax will be upheld regardless, based 







by Byron L. Warnken 
The University of Baltimore School of 
Law served as host school for the re-
gional client counseling competition on 
Saturday, March 6, 1976. The nine 
schools from Region Two participating 
were American University Law School, 
Catholic University Law School, Dela-
ware College of Law, Dickinson Univers-
ity Law School, Duquesne University 
Law School, Georgetown University 
Law School, University of Baltimore 
Law School, University of Maryland 
Law School, and Villanova University 
Law School. The winner of the competi-
tion was the University of Maryland, 
which now advances, along with eight 
other regional winners, to the national 
client counseling championship com-
petition, scheduled for Saturday, March 
27, at Notre Dame University, in South 
Bend, Indiana. 
The Region Two competition was 
coordinated by Assistant Dean William I. 
Weston, with the help of ten students 
from the Student Bar Associations. The 
nine participating teams drew lots and 
competed in three groups of three, with 
the three morning winners advancing to 
the afternoon. The morning winners 
were Georgetown (Group A), Duquesne 
(Group B), and Maryland (Group C), 
with Maryland winning the afternoon 
session. The three morning rounds and 
the round in the afternoon were each 
judged by a separate panel, with each 
panel consisting of three active prac-
titioners from the Bar Association of Bal-
timore City. Following the morning ses-
sion, a buffet luncheon was served in 
Langsdale Library to all participants, 
coaches, representatives from the com-
peting schools, and judges. 
The problem for this year's regional 
competition involved contract litigation 
and its alternatives, coupled with profes-
sional responsibility. The two-person 
teams received a terse two paragraph 
memorandum from the "secretary," re-
flecting information received from a 
phone call, during which the secretary 
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